Why be Moral?
Nearly every day one can turn on the news, scroll through their feed, or if one is lucky, find a daily paper, all to find a story that seems to rhyme with the one yesterday. Mass shootings, riots, chemical warfare, world leaders taunting one another over twitter, people driving vehicles through protests, what ever your heart desires, it is sure to come across the headlines throughout your week. Of course, all this can be averted and one can find themselves absorbed in cat videos, BuzzFeed articles, or figuring out who their celebrity crush would be, all of which is also at the tap of a finger. The latter choice seems to provide little more than a dopamine rush, the same kind of rush that a cocaine addict might exhibit. The former tends to lead one on a roller coaster of emotions, and events that would never affect one on a day to day basis now arise such extreme spikes consistently of anger, sadness, helplessness, and anxiousness. In either case, however, one could begin to question whether they have a reason to act in a certain way or not. As a rational being, having a reason to act should in itself be a motivation to also carry out the act, as an internalist will claim. But if I am an externalist, then simply having a reason does not also give me motivation to act, that comes from another source. Therefore, there seems to be two factors, that if answered, will bring to an end the confusion one may acquire when asking the question of “why be moral?”
The first of the factors is that of having a reason to do something or acting in a certain way. It provides the “ought” in the “one ought to…” phrase. However, to have a reason does not follow that it is a good reason. For example, if I am walking about a city and find a man on the ground whom is homeless, I could conjure up reasons inside my head that lead me to the final decision of kicking the man and running away. Along the lines of my reasoning I could include that the city had a homeless problem, that I thought I saw him move towards me and it was in self-defense, or that I just simply didn’t like him. All of which are reasons, but what then, qualifies as a good reason? For it would commonly be said that the best reason of action towards the man would be to do absolutely nothing. Why cause any altercation whatsoever? In fact, one might even say I have a really good reason to help him. Yet, it all alludes to an illusionary bar of goodness being set.
From a Kantian perspective, this illusion is fine, for Philippa Foot’s argument wishes to show that although people tend to rely on “a magical force” that gives power to the “moral ought”, it is part of human psychology, and therefore does not really exist. (Foot, 291) In the nature of being a human, we are unable to interface with reality as it is in itself, but rather objects as they are must be filtered through our senses. Due to this, a “moral ought” is in itself unknowable but only through the representations of our understanding. So, how is it one answers the question of what they ought to do if in fact one can actually never know the answer? Part of the psychology of humans seems to be that of having feelings and intuitions. At this point there seems no escape, for I challenge anyone to devoid themselves of emotion. Sure, I leave open the possibility to the skeptic that one could mediate for years upon a mountain high above the clouds, all to find bliss in the fleeting moment of lost emotion. But the common person still questions “Why be moral?”, without a chance to endeavor upon such a feat.
In the end, myself included, most will be subject to the constant barrage of emotions from the continuous stream of stimulus that is our day to day lives. What various emotions and intuitions people can feel as well, and all for a personal attainment. “Honest action may happen to further a man’s career; charitable actions do not happen to further the good of others.” (Foot, 290) For even if my intentions are to help a homeless man that I happen upon, what if, to my ignorance, I give him twenty dollars only to enable him to buy a bottle of liquor in support of his alcoholism? In preforming the action, I in fact have not done the charitable thing or helped the man, I have actually caused more harm than good. However, that action in itself, as would be seen by society in which we live, is honest and good. I preform the act, it would seem, from a set of standards that are constructed by society in which I attempt to socially advance in the eyes of others, seeking personal attainment. In a way, my actions are good because I do them, but the standard comes about from society in which rates the value of my action. Being trapped within our psychology, I do not preform the action from some force or duty or because I “ought” to, but because I desire to position myself in such and such a way in society.
As people act in all sorts of fashions, and if simply having reason for being moral was enough, the second factor of why one should be moral arises naturally and that is of motivation to act in a specific way. Presupposing that we can consider humans as rational beings and that through rationality they come upon reasons for acting, there are two ways to go about harmonizing motivation and reason together. From an internalist perspective, my reason to act is also my motivation to act, wherein acting will satisfy my desire. Desires are like feelings, I am unable to get out of them, for I simply just have desires. The collection of desires that I have form a motivational set for acting. (Williams, 292) The contents of a motivational set can include one’s childhood, where they live, who their friends are, their socioeconomic status, their career, where they went to school, or any array of influences on someone’s character. However, the important part to grasp is that I have a motivational set that influences how I act because it influences how I perceive and view reality. It tweaks the filter that is my psychology that I interface I use to interface with reality.
Of course, my motivational set is fluid and can change through practical reasoning, a tool that can be utilized on account of the presupposed rationality. I can add to my motivational set and subtract as needed to better achieve my desires. Through deliberation, I may find that the desire I have could be best achieved by Ø-ing in such a way, for example, a desire to achieve optimum health. To achieve optimum health rests on a multitude of factors, but one includes having a healthy diet. What the deliberative process looks like is when I hold the desire to consume ice cream, a sweet and sugary treat that is counterproductive in the chase of health, and I reflect on what I actually desire. I then make decisions in accordance to what I ultimately want, subtracting desires that do not achieve my goal, and possibly coming to find false beliefs, such as thinking sugar is healthful, that change my motivational set. (Williams, 294)
The externalist demands more from merely having a reason to perform an act as also having motivation to perform an act. The trouble with this view is that they seem to be able to separate their desires from their motivation, believe they have control over their emotions and desires. Let us suppose that we are lost in a dessert and have gone without water for two days. After traveling by foot for some way we happen upon a small puddle of clean water. The reason that I could give you to drink could vary from the fact you will die without hydration after three days, that it is highly improbable to cross paths with another source of water in our journey, or I could also give as a weak reason that it is your duty, of which we have seen is nothing more than a reason from society or another arbitrary source. However, no amount of reasoning can move another’s body to contort in a kneeling fashion, cusp their hands together, open their mouth, and deliver water to their lips. Rather, I hope that through my reasoning they will be moved to act. Yet, the externalist will hold that there still is a “special way the connexion between acquiring a motivation and coming to believe the reason statement” must come about. (Williams, 296)
What “special force” would the externalist like agents to acknowledge? The implications of what the externalist wants to claim ultimately lead one in the situation of being stranded in a dessert to come to deny the act of drinking water. In such a case we would call the agent irrational, as they are going against all reason, even in such a case that pertains to their own mortality. This leaves the externalist view as a “false, or incoherent, or really something else misleading,” view. (Williams, 297) Therefore, when a rational agent comes to have a good reason for acting, they also become motivated to act in accordance with which they believe in doing so will achieve their desires, influenced by their motivational set, all of which is inescapable. (Williams, 296) The fact that they have a desire is the motivation to act, unless one wishes to be deemed irrational or to achieve what the skeptic wishes to hold, which is to meditate into oblivion.
I believe there are some general and obvious facts that must be acknowledged when answering the question of “why be moral?” The first fact is that in this reality, whether we want to make it mind-dependent and say the agents are fabrications, or that substance is independent of the mind and other agents are outside of us, there still stands that we must interact with other agents. Another fact is that there seems to be multiple systems that provide adequate solutions for questions of morality. We can compare side by side the different systems, all with their pros and cons, but there are no objective criteria that can tell us which the best is, and even if there was, our psychology limits us from knowing such things. As I have shown above, agents also have desires that motivate them to act according to their subjective motivational set. As we are unable to escape our desires, it seems as well that we are unable to escape acting.
In conclusion, reality is set up in such a way that limits the psychology of humans from being able to obtain objective knowledge of morality. Part of the nature of being human also contains desires that collectively make up an agent’s subjective motivational set, in which all agents must interact with each other. The systems that are then constructed are to allow for the best possible way that agents may act freely, without infringing on other agents. Being moral then becomes about education, creating and influencing other agent’s motivational sets to best match your own. Of course, society sets the standard that an individual’s motivational set must live up too, but it does not matter which society one finds themselves in. If one is in America, then it would behoove them to take on such a motivational set as to match other agents in America. If someone found themselves in Rome, then one should “act as the Romains do.” The point being that morality is a construction that allows for the interaction of agents coherently, educating and shaping the desires one acquires in their motivational set. In that way, “moral oughtness” comes from the norm of society, and the reason being that an agent is within said society. Given their motivational set, one that is taught by society, the agent has no choice but to act in such a way, but not because they ought too, but because they want too, as they have been taught. In this way the “moral ought” harmonizes with the desires one has, and the solution to “why be moral?” becomes observable in instances that go against the motivational set taught in society.
Citation
Shafer-Landau, R., & Cuneo, T. (2013). Foundations of ethics: An anthology. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.